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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

In his book Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations, Theodor
Meron takes a constructive approach towards evaluating the quality
and effectiveness of the UN human rights policy-making system.
Meron first selects several policy instruments for analysis, identifying
their technical weaknesses. He then evaluates structural problems
inherent in the law-making institutions, proposing reforms for the
institutions as well as for the human rights law-making process itself.
As an institution which protects human rights, the UN's legitimacy
depends on its acceptance by the constituent States. A fundamental
weakness in the UN's ability to promulgate and effectively implement
human rights legislation is the reluctance of individual States to
support legislation due to unacceptable provisions. For example, the
mandate in Article 2(f) of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, I ("Discrimination Against
Women Convention") which demands that States take "all appropriate
measures . . . to modify . . . customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women" (p. 64) (emphasis added), potentially
conflicts with the rights of ethnic and religious groups whose deeplyrooted traditions restrict women's freedom. Likewise, Article 4 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("Racial Discrimination Convention"), by mandating
the imposition of criminal liability for the dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, 2 infringes on freedoms of speech and
association which democratic societies consider inviolable. The existence of such conflicts, while perhaps inevitable in an international
forum as diverse as the UN, greatly impedes progress in the formulation of human rights instruments. But Meron believes that the
political nature of this forum does not preclude the possibility nor the
need for progressive change.
Although UN human rights instruments embrace admittedly ambitious and commendable goals, Meron contends that inadequacies in
the drafting of these instruments have created conflicts of interest with
other human rights instruments, gaps in the protection of certain
rights and unrealistic policy objectives. Meron discusses some ot the
drafting errors he considers to be most blatant in three of these
instruments: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
I Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainut Women, G.A. Res. 34/
180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 193, U.N. Doc A134/46 (1979) [hereinafter Discrimination
Against Women Convention].
2. Article 4(a) declares "an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination . . and also the provision of
any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof." 660 U.N.T S 195, reprinted
in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352 (1966); Meron at 318.
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("Political Covenant"), 3 the Discrimination Against Women Convention and the Racial Discrimination Convention.
The Racial Discrimination Convention drew its impetus from the
UN's desire to end discrimination against blacks and"other non-whites.
The Convention drew widespread support, so that it was rapidly
adopted and ratified by more States than almost any other human
rights treaty. The Convention appears to embrace the purpose of
achieving equality of result, not merely equality in the sense of equal
treatment. For example, Article 2(2) of the Convention obliges State
Parties to take affirmative action to achieve racial equality (p. 37),
and Article 2(1)(c) requires that States review government policies and
rescind any laws which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial
discrimination (p. 14) (emphasis added). However, the Convention's
definition of discrimination does not explicitly call for equality of
result. 4 Furthermore, the affirmative action provision fails to define
which "racial groups" should benefit from special measures or what
political, economic or social circumstances warrant ihe implementation
of such measures. To illustrate, Meron points out that by defining a
group by its minority status, a State could avoid its duty towards that
group by asserting that the group constitutes the largest percentage
of the population. Here, Meron fails to cite any specific examples,
e.g., the use of this tactic to perpetuate apartheid in South Africa.
Strangely enough, Meron does not mention South Africa at all in his
discussion of the Racial Discrimination Convention. Likewise, if a
racial group is defined by physical or ethnic characteristics, it is unclear
to what extent that group must differ from the rest of the population
in order to benefit from the affirmative action provision. Thus, Meron
suggests that a State's obligations should depend on a particular
group's access to political and economic resources and not on a numerical or anthropological basis.
Article 2(1)(d) of the Convention requires that States "prohibit and
bring to an end, by all appropriate means . . . racial discrimination
by any persons, group or organization" (p. 18). But when applying
policy as articulated in Article 2(lXd), what area of private life remains
beyond its reach? Meron argues that by failing to define the extent to
which a State may act to enforce the prohibition of discriminatory
practices, implementation of the Convention threatens to jeopardize
freedoms of thought and expression. Thus, countries in which these
3. IntrnationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter PoliticalCovenant].
4. Meron writes: "The Committee.
appears to regard equality of result as the principal
object of the Convention. That goal is reflected in several provisions of the Convention, for
instance Arts. 1(4) and 2(lXc), but is not explicitly stated in the Convention's definition of
racial discrimination" (p. 12)
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values are protected have had to resort to reservations to the Covenant.
According to Meron, proper balancing between protection of privacy
and the elimination of discriminatory practices could be achieved by
adopting an approach analogous to that embraced by the United States
6
Supreme Court in the case of Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, whereby
activities of large private entities and primarily nonselective organizations would be deemed public, and thus subject to State restrictions.
The Discrimination Against Women Convention suffers from similar drafting problems. Meron describes the Convention as "the first
universal instrument which focuses on the general prohibition of discrimination against women" (p. 53). Indeed, Meron agrees that the
Convention's focus on equality of result is necessary in order to achieve
systemic change. 7 However, many provisions in the Convention are
not sufficiently explicit. Article 4(2) exempts from the definition of
discrimination measures which are aimed at protecting "maternity,"
thereby leaving open the danger that this provision may be used as a
pretext to discriminate for "protective" purposes (p. 73). Article 11,
which refers to the right to job promotion, does not protect against
such discrimination during pregnancy or maternity leave (p. 75). In
Meron's view, a provision such as that contained in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 8 which requires that pregnancy be treated like other
temporary disabilities for employment-related purposes, would fill this
gap.

5. For example, Belgium has emphasized the need both to adopt the necessary legislation as
embodied in the Convention and to respect freedoms of expression and association. Great Britain

has limited the Convention's obligations to the extent to which they may be fulfilled with due
regard to the right to freedoms of opinion and peaceful assembly. The United States has also
made a declaration limiting the scope of obligations assumed under the Convention to those
which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and laws of the United States (p. 31 n.90).
6. In ReWerts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the United States Jaycees imposed
sanctions on two Minnesota local chapters for admitting women as regular Jaycee members in
violation of the Jaycees' bylaws. Local chapter members filed discrimination charges against the
organization under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.03, Subd. 3 (1982),
which prohibits the denial to any person of the "full and equal enjoyment of goods, services,
facilities . . . of a place of public accomodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability,
national origin or sex." Id. at 615. The Supreme Court held that application of the Act, by
compelling the Jaycees to accept women members, would not abridge male members' freedom
of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. In reaching this decision, the Court considered particular features of the organization, such as its large size, lack of criteria in judging
applicants for membership and the degree to which outsiders participated in the organization's
activities. The Court concluded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination justified the Act's minor impact on the male members' freedom of association.
7. Discrimination against women is defined in Article I as follows: "any distinction, exclusion,
orpArpose of impairing or nullifying
or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
of human rights and fundamental freedoms
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women
in the political, social, cultural, civil or any other field" (p. 59) (emphasis added).
8 Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U S ( § 2000e(k).
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The Discrimination Against Women Convention resembles the Racial Discrimination Convention in that both instruments define discrimination so as to encompass private acts. In fact, to the extent that
the Discrimination Against Women Convention seeks to abolish "customs and practices" which discriminate against women, 9 Meron argues
that it conflicts with the ideas embraced in the Racial Discrimination
Convention as well as in the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief.' 0 Moreover, the Discrimination Against Women Convention
contains a resolution of conflicts provision (Article 23) which gives
interpreting bodies little guidance as to' which policy should govern
when selecting or balancing conflicting rights. The resolution states,
"[n]othing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that
are more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and
women. . ." (emphasis added). " According to Meron, this simplistic
approach does little to clarify the relationship between conflicting
priorities.
Meron refers to the Political Covenant as "the most important
universal instrument on civil and political rights . . ." (p. 83). One
of the main weaknesses of the Covenant, however, relates to the right
given State Parties to restrict the application of certain articles of the
Political Covenant in times of emergency (Meron refers to this as the
right of derogation). Since it is in times of emergency that human
rights abuses are most extreme, such derogation clauses deserve special
attention. The potential for governments to abuse these clauses is
considerable, particularly in view of the fact that certain countries
have extended states of emergency indefinitely. Meron cites the example of Chile, where "since 1973 not one day had passed. . . without
a state of emergency being in force" (p. 88). Meron concludes that
the "real value of human rights instruments should therefore be tested
by examining their derogation clauses" (p. 87). The Political Covenant
falls short in this regard. Although the Covenant requires that a State
notify other State Parties when it invokes its derogation right, the
Covenant imposes no penalty for failure to notify. In effect, therefore,
the Covenant has no real deterrent effect. The Covenant's weakness
with regard to derogation rights is compounded by the fact that the
list of non-derogable rights (those rights which must be absolutely
9. Article 2(f) demands -appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish

existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women"
DiscriminationAgainst Women Convention, supra note 1; Meron at 64 (emphasis added).
10. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dticrmination Based on
Religion or Belief, G A Res. 36/55, 36 U.N GAOR Supp. (No. 51) 171. U N. Doc. &136/51
(1981). Adopted by the General Assembl) of the UN on November 25. 1981
11. DiscriminationAgaint Women Convention. supra note 1. Meron at 7
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respected by all States at all times) listed under the Covenant is
extremely limited. 12 One provision protects persons from imprisonment for the failure to fulfill a contractual obligation (Meron calls this
a non-essential provision whose inclusion amongst non-derogable
rights is "bizarre"), but the Covenant fails to provide due process
guarantees or to prohibit deportation. Some non-derogable rights,
although included in the Covenant, are not clearly defined. For example, Article 7 fails to provide criteria with which to distinguish
torture from lesser forms of cruel treatment. 13 This lack of criteria
creates ambiguities when attempting to apply the Article to concrete
cases.
Although deficiencies in the instruments discussed above involve in
part the inability of policy-makers to reach a political consensus,
Meron claims that these deficiencies could have been resolved or at
least alleviated through better drafting. Meron also suggests that,
although human rights instruments should be more advanced than the
mores of the community, at times the moral ideal should be relaxed
in order to encourage greater acceptance of the instrument among the
State Parties. On the other hand, Meron observes that the broad range
and sensitive nature of the issues dealt with by the Political Covenant
makes the possibility of obtaining a consensus on amendments to the
Political Covenant unlikely; as an alternative, he points to gap-filling
methods. For example, in the instance of torture, the UN has already
adopted a separate instrument, the International Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 14 The further adoption of specialized instruments in areas
such as abolition of the death penalty or the elaboration of certain
non-derogable due process rights would remedy other weaknesses inherent in the Political Covenant.
Meron's discussion of the Political Covenant illustrates how he
acknowledges the practical difficulties involved in formulating an
instrument which serves diverse needs, but he goes beyond a critique
of the instruments. More importantly, Meron proposes that the con12. The list of non-derogable rights includes: Article 6 (right to life), Article 7 (prohibition
against torture), Article 8(1) (prohibition against slavery), Article 8(2) (prohibition against
involuntary servitude), Article 11 (prohibition against imprisonment for inability to fulfill a
contractual duty), Article 15 (prohibition against holding one guilty of a criminal offense on
account of an act or omission which did not constitute such an offense), Article 16 (right to
recognition as a person before the law) and Article 18 (right to freedom of thought). See Political
Covenant, supra note 3; Meron at 91.

13. Article 7 reads: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation." Political Covenant, supra note 3; Meron at 297.
14. Internationl Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 51) 197, U.N. Doc. A/39151
(1985).
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flicts which exist between different human rights instruments (or
within the same instrument) can be remedied through structural and
procedural changes in the law-making process itself. In particular,
Meron analyzes structural weaknesses in the hierarchy of international
legal norms which underlie human rights policy. He then evaluates
inconsistencies in the interpretation and legislation of legal instruments. Finally, Meron suggests ways in which the UN could integrate
its law-making system, both through the adoption of novel legislating
techniques and through the creation of specialized bodies which would
deal exclusively with UN human rights law-making.
Formulating a given policy instrument involves a prior determination of values to be protected. When there .is no consensus on those
values (e.g., advancement of women's rights versus elimination of
racial or religious discrimination), conflicts arise in the implementation
of human rights policy. Thus, Meron argues that an underlying complicating factor in the field of human rights law-making is the lack
of a defined hierarchy of international legal norms.
Unlike national legal systems where, as in the United States, constitutional provisions "trump" ordinary statutes, in international law
such instances are rare. One exception to the absence of hierarchical
ordering of rights is the concept ofjus cogens. Although the legitimacy
of this principle is not disputed, in practice the concept is still of
limited applicability. 15
But typical of this lack of hierarchical ordering of rights is the
confusion surrounding the terms "fundamantal human rights," "basic
rights of the human person" and other rights. Although there has
been much academic discourse over distinctions among these concepts,
Meron 'contends that the various terms have been used interchangeably
in the formulation of human rights instruments. The historical development of such terms has helped to establish the idea, essential to
the advancement of human rights, that there is a certain class of
"fundamental" rights, firmly rooted in international law, which all
States have a legal interest in protecting. Nonetheless, at the present
time there is no accepted system by which such higher rights can be
determined. Indiscriminate use of such labels, Meron warns, may
adversely affect the credibility of human rights as a legal discipline.
The international community should rather direct its efforts towards
defining the legal significance of a distinction between ordinary and
15. This principle is defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 39/27 at Art. 53, as a "norm from which no derogation is permitted,"
Meron at 190. Meron questions the practical relevance of this term to agreements implicating
human rights: "States are nor inclined to contest the absolute illegality of acts prohibited by the
principle ofjm cogem. When such acts do rake place, States deny the factual allegations or justify
violations by more subtle or ingenious arguments," Meron at 190.
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higher rights, extending the internationally-recognized list of nonderogable rights and allowing the concept of jus cogens to develop
gradually through general consensus.
With regard to the interpretation and implementation of existing
human rights instruments, Meron advocates the development of an
integrated system of implementation, ideally through the establishment of a UN human rights tribunal which would supervise the entire
body of UN human rights law. A single supervisory organ would serve
to reduce the conflicts which arise among diverse policy instruments
by balancing differing policies against each other in much the same
way that national courts conduct "balancing tests." Furthermore, in
any particular adjudication, a co-ordinated system of interpretation
would work to raise overall standards by evaluating norms developed
in two different organs and applying the norm most favorable to the
outcome of the particular case. The Court of Justice of the European
Communities has taken this approach; however, most supervisory
organs apply the norms articulated in their founding instruments.
Meron warns that an organization's ability to achieve higher norms is
limited by the willingness of the States to abide by these norms.
Meron also points out legislative techniques which would both
integrate the law-making system and raise normative standards. He
cites the example of the Council of Europe, which has succeeded in
raising its regional standards to the level set by global bodies through
the adoption of additional protocols to existing instruments via a
legislative process. In recognition of the fact that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms' 6 had embraced a narrower scope of norms than those embraced by the Political Covenant, the Council of Europe incorporated
an additional list of rights (including the abolition of the death penalty
in peacetime), to the European Convention through the protocol adoption process. The Council of Europe's approach is particularly desirable
in that it views law-making not as the creation of a particular instrument, but rather as a continuing, evolving process.
To reduce conflict between human rights instruments, Meron cites
a number of specific techniques which the International Labor Organization ("ILO") proposed in 1973.17 An organization should, whenever possible, use legislative restraint if a matter has previously been
left to another organization. If existing legislation is not satisfactory,
it should undergo revision by the enacting organ. Cross-reference
clauses, if formulated correctly, can clarify which of two norms should
16. Europtan Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
17 Meron at 202-03.
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govern, particularly where there are normative differences between
separate instruments (such as the conflict between discrimination
against women and religious freedom). Meron does concede that some
conflicts are due to political differences rather than technical considerations, but he stresses that ambiguous clauses not only fail to prevent
conflicts, but they present problems of interpretation. Meron advocates
the establishment of an interorganizational committee to detect normative and jurisdictional conflicts at an early stage with an aim towards
proposing solutions.
With regard to institutional structure, Meron suggests throughout
his analysis that the UN create specialized bodies which would serve
to integrate policy legislation and implementation. On a broader level,
Meron proposes that the General Assembly establish a small body of
experts, entrusted with the duty to continuously review human rights
instruments in the entire UN system. Ultimately, Meron urges the
creation of an organ that would devote itself exclusively to human
rights law-making (the Human Rights Commission, which devotes
much of its energies to investigating human rights abuses, cannot
adequately fulfill this role). The success of such organizations as the
ILO demonstrates that specialized bodies with a highly structured
procedure and expert personnel have proven to be effective in the
8
formulation of UN policy. 1
Skeptics may argue that the political nature of human rights policymaking would make any substantial reforms unlikely, or that the UN
is already overstaffed. But it is Meron's principal contention that,
regardless of political considerations, the need for structural and procedural reforms does in fact exist: "It]he subject of human rights lawmaking is crucial, the present system inadequate, and reform needed.
The academic community therefore has both the moral and professional
obligation to lead the way, to suggest reforms, and to work for their
adoption" (p. 291).
Karen Halverson
18. Meron describes the ILO's legislative procedures as being highly structured and known
for their proven effectiveness. He observes, moreover, that "there is no reason why some of its
features should not inspire appropriate reforms in UN human rights law-making" (p. 283).

